# Advance Questions for Paul M. Longsworth Nominee for the Position of Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration

#### Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

A. The duties of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation include preventing the spread of materials, technology, and expertise relating to weapons of mass destruction; detecting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction worldwide; eliminating inventories of surplus fissile materials usable for nuclear weapons; and providing for international nuclear safety.

# What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

I have over 17 years of experience working with the Department of Energy and its national laboratory system. As a Federal employee, I have participated in every phase of the Federal procurement and budget process, and have managed both programs and people at in the DOE. work with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (and its predecessor agency during the Soviet era, the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry) dates back to 1989, when I helped the Department of Energy craft the first cooperative agreement on environmental restoration and waste management. While serving as a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, I was responsible for advising the Chairman on DOE oversight, budget, and policy matters. During the past two and a half years, I have served as the Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary of Energy for National Security and the Former Soviet Union. In this capacity, I have participated in reviewing and advising the Secretary on re-shaping the nonproliferation programs of the National Nuclear Security Administration in order to accelerate and expand their scope to rapidly address the most urgent threats.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

A. No, not at this time. I feel confident that my past experiences have prepared me well to carry out the duties of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration would prescribe for you?

A. I anticipate that the Administrator would authorize me to carry out fully all the programs of the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to support and implement the policies of the President. He has not indicated that he intends to prescribe any additional duties or functions other than those enumerated in the NNSA Act.

#### If confirmed, how would you work with the following:

#### A. Other Deputies in the NNSA

B. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the other NNSA Deputy Administrators and the Associate Deputy Administrators on crosscutting programmatic issues such as budgets, security, counterintelligence, personnel, and procurement. The NNSA Administrator has established a Management Council to coordinate policy, financial, and other management issues. This Council has been very effective in establishing cohesion among the NNSA program offices and I intend to participate actively in its deliberations.

#### C. The Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management

A. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has no waste management or storage facilities of its own. As a result, many of aspects of the Office's Fissile Materials Disposition program must be coordinated with the Office of Environmental Management to ensure that the Mixed Oxide Fuel program remains on schedule and within cost. If

confirmed, I intend to work through the NNSA Administrator to establish cooperative and productive working relationship with Office of Environmental Management.

#### D. Other Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Energy

A. If confirmed, I intend to work through the NNSA Administrator to establish cooperative working relationships with other Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Energy, where necessary, to ensure that overall Departmental missions are met.

### E. Heads of relevant nonproliferation offices at the Departments of Defense and State

A. The Office of Nonproliferation has good working relationships with the nonproliferation staffs of the National Security Council and the Departments of State and Defense. In my current capacity as Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary of Energy, I work closely with these parties on a wide range of nonproliferation and national security issues. If confirmed, I would work to continue the existing partnerships with those organizations and try to improve them where possible.

#### Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

A. The principal challenge confronting the Deputy Administrator will be improving Russia's ability to more effectively utilize NNSA threat reduction funding. A longer term challenge is determining how best to reallocate NNSA resources and capabilities to address evolving proliferation threats outside the Former Soviet Union.

# Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

A. Improving Russia's ability to more effectively utilize NNSA threat reduction funding will require a number of steps, including working with the Russian Ministry of

Atomic Energy to improve contract review procedures, streamline access at MinAtom and other sites, and breaking down other barriers that hinder NNSA-funded activities. The Administrator has identified the need to address evolving proliferation threats outside the Former Soviet Union. The effort to characterize and respond to these threats will be an ongoing effort for the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.

What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

A. The most serious management problems facing the Deputy Administrator are: (1) establishing a program management system for the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation; (2) recruiting and retaining skilled staff capable of carrying the diverse mission of the Office; and (3) continuing to improve the rates at which authorized funds are costed and obligated.

# If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

A. If confirmed, I will work with the Associate
Administrator for Management and Administration to
ensure the full implementation of a program management
system which is compatible with the Five Year Nuclear
Security Plan (FYNSP) and the Planning, Budgeting,
Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation (PBP&E) system
within NNSA. I will work to continue the
Nonproliferation Graduate Internship Program and other
mentoring programs. I will also work with the
contractors and program managers who execute programs in
Russia to find ways to improve the rates at which funds
are costed and obligated.

#### Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

A. The threat that nuclear materials, technology, or knowhow might fall into the hands of a terrorist organization remains unacceptably high. Programs carried out by the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation continue to work down this threat, but the threat is an expanding and evolving one. If confirmed as the Deputy Administrator, my highest priority will be to complete the task of securing the nuclear weapons complex in Russia and the Former Soviet Union, while preparing to address the new threats that arise in other regions of the world.

#### National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

According to the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction of 2002, "strengthening nonproliferation to combat weapons of mass destruction proliferation" is one of the three principal pillars of U.S. national security strategy. In this regard, the National Strategy states that "we will identify and pursue new methods of prevention, such as national criminalization of proliferation activities and expanded safety and security measures."

If confirmed as Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, what steps would you propose to provide "new methods of prevention" and "expanded safety and security measures"?

A. If confirmed, I will continue to support the broad U.S. effort to establish new methods of preventing transfers of WMD materials, technology, and expertise. Such efforts would include: (1) working with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen its existing safeguards capabilities; (2) working with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to strengthen and enhance existing safeguards efforts; and (3) assessing ways to update and strengthen existing export control measures.

#### GAO Report

According to the March 2003 GAO report, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, the Department of Energy (DOE) "plans to help secure Russia's weapons-usable nuclear material by 2008; however the department lacks access to many sites. As a result, most of [the department's] expenditures in the past 2 years went to functions other than securing buildings, such as maintaining previously installed equipment and developing nuclear security regulations."

### If confirmed, what steps would you take to address these continuing problems in Russia?

A. If confirmed, I will continue to press my Russian counterparts to expeditiously address the issue of access to Russian sites. Such efforts would include finding ways to mitigate Russian security concerns while improving the access necessary for U.S. experts to confirm that work was completed. I will also continue to work closely with the NNSA Administrator, the Secretary of Energy, and the Department of State to ensure our concerns are raised to the highest levels in the Russian government.

#### Baker Cutler Task Force

The Baker Cutler Task Force report of 2001, A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, stated that the task force observed "impediments to DOE program implementation that should be addressed on an urgent basis. Many of these seem to revolve around restrictions on international travel stemming from both DOE international regulations and procedures in other U.S. government agencies. These restrictions appear to have created unnecessary paperwork and bureaucratic impediments. They hinder DOE's ability to supervise work in the nonproliferation programs, maintain the pace of projects, and ensure that funds are used appropriately."

If confirmed, what management improvements would you propose to address the impediments to program implementation, including the "urgent" problem with the international travel process within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, identified by the Baker-Cutler Task Force?

A. For the most part, the problems identified in the January 2001 Baker-Cutler report have been eliminated and do not pose any appreciable impediment to the pace of work being carried out in Russia. However, the Russian government has placed new restrictions on travelers entering the Russian Federation. These new restrictions will take effect later this year and could have an adverse impact on the ability of U.S. experts to travel to Russia.

#### Harvard University Report

According to the March 2003 Harvard University report, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, "It is crucial that the United States and the other countries involved provide the financial and personnel resources needed to secure the world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials, and to accomplish the other steps needed to block the terrorist pathway to the bomb, as rapidly as these jobs can be done. As noted earlier, the available budgets are now large enough, and the non-monetary obstacles substantial enough, that simply adding money to existing programs, while making no other changes, would in most cases do little to strengthen or accelerate these efforts."

What is your view of this perspective, and what changes, if any, would you make to strengthen or accelerate these programs?

B. My view of the above statement is that it is fundamentally correct. The greatest challenge facing U.S. threat reduction programs in Russia is not the level of funding, it is the Russian's ability to utilize funding from U.S. and other sources for these threat reduction programs.

The March 2003 Harvard University report on Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials contains several innovative and actionable recommendations to both strengthen and accelerate NNSA's threat reduction programs in Russia; however, most of the report's specific recommendations were being implemented prior to its publication. For example, the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction was established in June of last year and will provide more than \$20 billion over 10 years to address proliferation concerns in Russia.

#### Need for Financial Management Improvements

At present, DOE's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs are averaging uncosted balances of almost 50 percent of the programs' total appropriated budget. The DOE-wide average is 15 percent.

If confirmed, what management initiatives would you propose

to lower the level of uncosted balances for all DOE Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs?

A. Uncosted balances reached a high of 48% in fiscal year 2002 because of several unique circumstances. Among these were the government-wide nonproliferation review conducted by the National Security Council in 2001, the post-September 11 travel freeze, and an influx of supplemental funding provided by Congress late in the fiscal year. Clearly, NNSA's Nonproliferation program cannot sustain uncosted balances of 50%. If confirmed, I will work aggressively to draw down uncosted balances in the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to the lowest practical level.

#### Proliferation Detection

Early detection of proliferation activities has never been more critical. The nonproliferation and verification research and development program in the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation plays a key role in conducting applied research to develop near and long-term nuclear proliferation detection systems that can provide policymakers with timely information to curtail such activities.

If confirmed, what efforts would you undertake to ensure that technologies developed in this area would support the nonproliferation programs within the Office Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, as well as related programs at the Department of Defense?

A. The Verification Research and Development program plays a pivotal role in the broader interagency community concerned with detecting, deterring, and attributing proliferation throughout the world. The work carried out by this office, in many areas, represents the cutting edge of technology. I strongly support these activities and will ensure that they are integrated with and supportive of the activities of the Department of Defense and other relevant Federal agencies.

#### Nuclear Explosions Monitoring

Do you believe that the United States' existing nuclear explosions monitoring capabilities are sufficient to deter and detect any nuclear explosions?

A. No. Current U.S. nuclear explosions monitoring capabilities are sufficient to detect, and therefore deter, most postulated testing scenarios. However, the technological capability to remotely detect and attribute all possible tests, particularly certain evasive or clandestine test scenarios, is not adequate.

What additional steps, if any, do you believe should be taken by the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to enhance U.S. nuclear explosions monitoring capabilities?

A. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has a vigorous research and development program to address this deficiency. If confirmed, I will fully support continued R&D in this area to ensure that U.S. capabilities keep pace with emerging threats.

#### Fissile Materials Disposition

In your view, does the MOX program continue to advance the non-proliferation goal of reducing weapons grade plutonium in the United States and in Russia?

B. Yes. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is responsible for -- among other things - detecting, securing, and eliminating surplus fissile materials that pose a risk to the U.S. or its allies. The Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel program is the only cooperative U.S.-Russian program to permanently eliminate weapons-usable plutonium. This must remain one of our highest objectives in the effort to stem the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction.

# Do you support accelerating the highly enriched uranium program?

A. Yes. I support U.S. efforts to accelerate the blending down of weapons-origin highly-enriched uranium (HeU) in Russia. The U.S.-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement converts Russian weapons-origin HeU into nuclear reactor fuel. Both the U.S and Russia have designated commercial parties to carry out that agreement, which results in the blend-down and import into the U.S. of about 30 metric tons of Russia uranium each year. Increasing the rate at which Russian weapons-origin HeU is blended down - and therefore no

longer attractive to terrorists - is very important. However, it must be done in a manner that does not adversely affect the international uranium market.

#### Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

A. Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

A. Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

A. Yes.